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Editorial
An unstoppable force and an
immoveable object? EU data protection
law and national security
Christopher Kuner*, Fred Cate**, Orla Lynskey**,
Christopher Millard**, Nora Ni Loideain** and Dan Svantesson**
The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (EU) (CJEU/Luxembourg Court), the
EU’s highest court, is gaining a reputation for its more
purposive and expansive interpretation and application
of EU data protection law. This is particularly so in rela-
tion to the right to data protection, as guaranteed by
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU
CFR) which became part of EU law in 2009 following
the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty [Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)].
In addition to Article 8 EU CFR, another important re-
form of EU data protection law in 2009 was Article 16
TFEU which provides an explicit legal basis for data pro-
tection legislation. Consequently, this relatively new legal
framework (especially Article 8 EU CFR) has played an in-
strumental role in a succession of landmark judgments
concerning the requirements and minimum safeguards
that must be applied by EU Member States when personal
data is processed for the purposes of law enforcement and
public security, or even national security with respect to
third countries (non-EU states). One such new require-
ment is the need to provide that personal data is retained
in the EU in order to ensure that it is subject to the inde-
pendent supervision of EU data protection authorities.
In its 2014 judgment of Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU
determined that this is ‘an essential component’ for the
protection of individuals under EU data protection law.
Notwithstanding the apparently unstoppable force of
the expanding scope of EU data protection law, EU law
[Article 4(2) of the Treaty of the EU (TEU)] states that
the EU
shall respect the equality of Member States before the
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their
fundamental structures, political and constitutional,
inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall re-
spect their essential State functions, including ensuring the
territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order
and safeguarding national security. In particular, national
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member
State.
Notably, Article 4 TEU clearly stresses that ‘national se-
curity remains the sole responsibility of each Member
State’. Hence, this exemption from EU law should mean
that Article 8 EU CFR and Article 16 TFEU should not
apply to any national security matters governed by do-
mestic law as these provisions are only relevant to
‘Member States when carrying out activities that fall
within the scope of EU law.’
Soon after these major legal changes within EU law
(particularly the elevation of data protection to a funda-
mental right) the Snowden revelations concerning sys-
tematic government surveillance, in the US and beyond,
began to emerge. As we have discussed previously, expo-
sure of these national security programmes has since led
to soul-searching by policymakers worldwide about
both the relevance and the effectiveness of existing legal
frameworks for ensuring the adequate protection and
security of privacy and personal data.1 In particular,
these revelations have cast a rather stark light on the ex-
tent to which legislators and courts have deferred to a
State’s interpretation of the situations it faces in permit-
ting limitations on the rights of individuals where mat-
ters of national security arise given the sensitive and
confidential nature of the information collected, ana-
lysed, and shared. Of course, at the EU level, as noted
above, any fundamental rights-based scrutiny of
Member State law governing national security has been
deemed to fall outside of the competence of the CJEU.
* Editor-in-Chief.
** Editor.
1 See our Editorial on ‘PRISM and Privacy: Will This Change Everything?’
(2013) 3(4) International Data Privacy Law 217 <http://idpl.oxfordjour
nals.org/content/3/4/217.full.pdfþhtml?sid¼b7d189ef-0ab1-4b92-8dd9-
dbaa2b4b024f>.
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A pending preliminary reference, however, to that court
may shortly determine otherwise for an area of law and
policymaking that has long been an immovable object
of national sovereignty from the primacy of EU law.
The case at issue is one in a series of legal challenges
brought by Privacy International, a leading interna-
tional civil society organization based in the UK, against
the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs and other public authorities regarding their
respective powers concerning covert surveillance. The
preliminary reference was submitted to the CJEU in
October 2017. Responsibility for this referral lies with
the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) which
investigates complaints concerning the surveillance
programmes of the UK’s security and intelligence agen-
cies.2 Essentially, the IPT has been put in a position
whereby it must seek clarification from the CJEU re-
garding whether or not, or to what extent, the privacy
and data protection requirements and minimum safe-
guards established by the CJEU in its earlier judgments
of Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 Sverige AB & Watson
apply in the context of national security. EU law pro-
vides that national courts of Member States are unable
to rule on the validity of EU law and, therefore, must
refer such cases to the CJEU.3
More specifically, the IPT has requested that the
CJEU establish (especially in light of Article 4 TEU),
whether the activities of the intelligence services in rela-
tion to the bulk acquisition and use of communications
data (otherwise known as metadata) for the purposes of
national security fall within the scope of EU law.
Communications data does not reveal the content of a
communication. Instead, it identifies the ‘who’, ‘when’,
‘where’, and ‘how’ of a communication. It may reveal
much more about an individual’s private life when done
so in ‘bulk’.
This latter method of monitoring may encompass
the communications from all of an individual’s devices
(smartphones, tablets, and laptops). These may then be
retained over a lengthy period of time (usually six
months),4 combined, and analysed. The capacity to ag-
gregate and sift through the resulting detailed profiles
can be achieved through the combination of many iso-
lated items of information that may not in themselves
be considered private or personal. Hence, the bulk
collection of communications data can provide very
detailed ‘narrative data’ about an individual’s public
and private life, eg the nature of a relationship between
parties based on the frequency/time of their communi-
cations. Such information could prove to be valuable
within a national security context with respect to identi-
fying and tracking international networks of organized
crime and terrorist groups and the detection of
cyberattacks.
But what of the seemingly unequivocal clarity pro-
vided for by Article 4 TEU with respect to national secu-
rity remaining the sole responsibility of Member States?
What jurisprudential Gordian knot has prompted this
preliminary reference? The answer lies with the CJEU’s
2016 judgment of Tele2 Sverige AB & Watson and when
it made legal history in the 2014 landmark decision of
Digital Rights Ireland.
The proceedings in Digital Rights Ireland occurred
during the height of the Snowden revelations and this
may have influenced the outcome of the case. In any
event, it culminated in the first striking down of an
entire EU law for its incompatibility with the EU CFR.
Previously, the impugned legislative instrument in
question (the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC)
had imposed a mandatory obligation on every EU
Member State to ensure the mass retention of commu-
nications data (metadata) for the purpose of countering
serious crime. Consequently, the fundamental rights re-
quirements and safeguards established by the CJEU in
Digital Rights Ireland posed a number of thorny ques-
tions for policymakers. The most significant of these
questions was whether the CJEU had in fact held that
the very measure of ‘general and indiscriminate’ reten-
tion of communications data itself was incompatible
with EU fundamental rights, thereby rendering such
surveillance invalid under EU law.
In contrast to the arguments of the European
Commission and the Opinion of the Advocate General,
the CJEU answered this question affirmatively in Tele2
Sverige AB & Watson. Furthermore, the Grand
Chamber also established that in order to be compatible
with EU law, national laws on data retention must
be based on objective evidence making it possible to
‘identify a public whose data is likely to reveal a link’
with serious criminal offences and that that data con-
tributes ‘to fighting serious crime’ or to ‘preventing
a serious risk to public security’ (para 111). Does the
latter term of ‘public security’ also cover all matters
of national security? Certain parts of the CJEU’s analy-
sis in Watson suggest that the Luxembourg Court
has in made this determination with respect to its
2 For all documents relating to this preliminary reference, see the IPT
website <http://www.ipt-uk.com/judgments.asp?id¼41>.
3 Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lu¨beck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199.
4 Note that US law, under s 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (since repealed
following the Snowden revelations, replaced by new provisions under the
USA Freedom Act), provided for the bulk retention of communications
data by the NSA for up to five years.
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interpretation of Article 15 of the e-Privacy Directive
2002/58/EC.
Article 15 provides that Member States can restrict
the scope of traditional data protection safeguards and
adopt legislative measures for the long-term retention
of communications data. Such a restriction can be
adopted if it constitutes ‘a necessary, appropriate and
proportionate measure within a democratic society to
safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence,
public security, and the prevention, investigation,
detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of
unauthorised use of the electronic communication
system’. Hence, Article 15(1) allows Member States to
adopt legislation permitting data processing that would
otherwise not be permitted under the e-Privacy
Directive for certain legitimate purposes, including the
bulk collection of communications data in the context
of national security. Furthermore, Article 1(3) of the
e-Privacy Directive also states that it does not apply to
activities which fall outside of EU law and ‘in any case
to activities concerning public security, defence, State
security (including the economic well-being of the State
when the activities relate to State security matters) and
the activities of the State in areas of criminal law’.
Rather than clearly limit its examination of the appli-
cation of the e-Privacy Directive to data retention in the
context of serious crime, the CJEU left open the ques-
tion of whether data retention for all the legislative mea-
sures provided under Article 15(1) must comply with
the requirements and safeguards established in Watson.
The CJEU’s reasoning for this determination was based
on the Luxembourg Court ‘having regard to the general
structure of Directive 2002/58’, and that to hold other-
wise would leave Article 15 ‘deprived of any purpose’.
As a result, the CJEU is now being asked to confirm
whether in fact the discretion of Member States to
permit limitations on the data protection rights of
individuals where matters of national security arise
remains the sole responsibility of Member States, or
whether these restrictions are now subject to EU law,
and thus the scrutiny and review of the CJEU.
There are significant concerns regarding the often
uncertain and vague reasoning provided in Watson and
in other recent landmark data privacy judgments. In
particular, the analysis and application of the legality,
necessity, and proportionality requirements that apply
to the qualified rights of respect for private life and data
protection under the EU CFR are very general in scope.
Article 52 EU CFR provides that these rights are not
absolute and must be balanced with other legitimate
competing interests, such as law enforcement and
national security. Significantly in Watson, the relevant
jurisprudence lacks any assessment of how the risks
posed by the retention of communications data differ
from the risks involved in the subsequent use of the
data. In other words, the everyday capture and storage
of such data is ‘qualitatively different’ from the use of
that data to determine whether or not an individual is,
or is not, a terrorist threat.5 In addition, there is little
detailed examination of the different ways in which an
interference with the fundamental rights to private life
and data protection will warrant the consideration and
weighting of different factors depending on the legiti-
mate purpose at issue (law enforcement versus national
security).
Going forward, a more careful approach is needed in
order to provide for the development of a more consis-
tent, clear, and robust fundamental rights framework
with respect to the proportionately of the limitations
that are placed on an individual’s rights to private life,
and data protection. The quality of legal reasoning in
the CJEU could also benefit from acknowledgement of
the traditionally more comprehensive, and consequently
more robust, precedents in the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights and in deciding whether there
is a need to follow or distinguish its approach from this
more experienced supranational court. This clarity in
reasoning could greatly assist policymakers, supervisory
authorities, and courts, at both the EU and domestic
level and beyond, in the future development, implemen-
tation and review of legislation concerning data protec-
tion and wide-scale data processing for national
security. In any event, this is likely to remain one of the
most dynamic and technically complex areas of privacy
and data protection law.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipy003
5 CJ Bennett, The Privacy Advocates (MIT Press, Massachusetts 2008) 17.
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